The Polish constitutional crisis, also referred to as the rule of law and democracy crisis (Ash, 2016; Berendt, 2016; Schulz, 2016; Veser, 2015), centres primarily on the paralysis of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Constitutional Tribunal, a sole guardian of the Constitution, has found itself in a stalemate since autumn 2015 when the Law and Justice Party (PiS) came into power. The conservative Party has crippled the Tribunal by the non-acceptance of the three Tribunal’s judges elected by the previous Sejm (Lower Chamber of the Polish Parliament) and by the amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal Act, which effectively disabled its functioning. Such actions have provoked vociferous domestic and international reactions. For instance, it has triggered the following reactions: widespread protests around Poland, the creation of the Committee for the Defence of Democracy, criticism espoused by academics and NGOs, the ’debate about Poland’ in the European Parliament, the initiation of the unprecedented EU Commission procedure under 2014 Rule of Law Framework, and the unfavourable for the Polish government Venice Commission Opinion.