According to Article 2 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, ‘States […] shall respect and ensure the rights […] to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’. 

The main focus of this article orbits around the question whether the National Oil Companies (NOCs) are beset by problems when not using the Norwegian Model in governing the hydrocarbon resources? Could the Norwegian model be enforced in other countries? What is the cause-effect relation between the non-implementation of such a separation-of-functions model and the inherent problems that NOCs are faced with. 

In the European context, as well as in the national one, corruption has always represented an antisocial, unethical, and illegal behaviour affecting the welfare of the society by favouring the interests of a limited number of individuals. 

As our democratic society aims towards an ideology based on liberty and progression, normality is highly associated with a fast growth of the living standards and the wellbeing of the community. Consequently, this leads to an accelerating desire for swift enrichment, gaining personal advantage and material assets. In this manner, what we define as ‘normality’ gains its significance through the necessity of possessing something. The sensible question which may arise is whether non-participation in the process of stopping corruption and our indifference make us co-authors or participants in crimes, or our endeavors to combat this phenomenon is a benefit to the whole society?

1. Introduction

The importance of security interests in the commercial world need not be understated. As Sir Roy Goode (2009) explains, enterprises live (and sometimes die) by credit. Security interests help reduce this credit risk and protect the priority of the security-holder over other creditors in the event of the debtor’s bankruptcy. 

I will argue that traditional security interests under English law such as the equitable charge, coupled with freedom of contract, are adequately flexible for the needs of the financial market. Nevertheless, I will argue that incorporation of financial collateral arrangements through the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) 2002/47, allows English law to remain competitive and attractive to financial institutions. This article will first examine the current flexibility of traditional security interests under English law, and then briefly discuss the advantages offered by financial collateral arrangements. 

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